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ARTICLES

Out with the New and in With the Old: Why the Illinois Supreme Court went
too far in Kirk v. Michael Reese Hospital and not far enough in Renslow v.
Mennonite Hospital on the issue of duties owed to third-party non-patients in
medical malpractice cases
Andrea MacIver ...................................................................................... 1
When the Illinois Supreme Court decided Renslow v. Mennonite Hospital
in 1977 and Kirk v. Michael Reese Hospital in 1987, it was presented with
unique facts where a third-party, non-patient was allegedly harmed by a
physician’s negligence. In its attempt to determine where the line for
liability should be drawn in each case and whether a duty of care should be
imposed, the court did not issue rulings that were limited to the facts of each
case. Instead, the court created an exception in Renslow and a bright-line
rule in Kirk. Unfortunately, not only do such rigid, legal rules not translate
well to the field of medicine and science, which is always changing and
developing, but they conflict with the notion that judges are to determine the
issue of duty as a matter of law on a case-by-case basis. As a result, litigants
and judges have struggled with applying the holdings of Renslow and Kirk in
unique, real-life cases, often to the detriment of plaintiffs whose claims are
dismissed prematurely.
This Article argues, in essence, that the Illinois Supreme Court went too
far in Kirk when it created a bright-line rule on the issue of duty in cases
involving third-party non-patients, but not far enough in Renslow when it
created an exception to the general duty principles. In conjunction, the
rulings in Renslow and Kirk have resulted in some cases being dismissed
prematurely based on a lack of a legal duty. In order to avoid dismissing
cases prematurely, while still ensuring that duties are imposed in
appropriate cases, the Illinois supreme court needs to limit the rulings it
handed down in Renslow and Kirk to the facts of each case and go back to
allowing judges to determine the issue of duty on a case-by-case basis based
on the reasonable foreseeability of the harm. Not only would such an
approach be fair and just, it would also be more in line with legal principles
that have been recognized in Illinois for decades and would give courts more
flexibility in adapting to new scientific and medical developments as they
arise.

Dogging Darwin: America’s Revolt Against the Teaching of Evolution
Ruth C. Stern & J. Herbie DiFonzo ....................................................... 33
More than four in ten Americans believe that God created humans in their
present form 10,000 years ago. American antagonism toward the teaching
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of evolution is deeply rooted in fundamentalist tradition and an aversion to
intellectualism. These forces have combined to demonize Charles Darwin to
such an extent that sectarian-based legal and political attacks on evolution
show no signs of abating. Darwin’s day in court began in 1925 with the
famous Scopes Monkey Trial. It continued into the 21st century with
Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Schools. Throughout, the core creationist agenda
has remained the same, although an evolution in labeling has produced such
variants as “creation science,” “intelligent design,” “teach the
controversy,” and, more recently, “sudden emergence theory.”
Along the way, anti-evolutionists invoked the First Amendment’s Free
Exercise Clause to argue that religious freedom trumps the church-state
divide. They also claimed, pursuant to the Establishment Clause, that
maintaining a secular state imposes a decree of non-belief on Christian
citizenry. Bracketed by the events in Dayton, Tennessee and Dover,
Pennsylvania, this article explores the anti-evolutionist crusade and
concludes that creationist interpretations of the First Amendment are
untenable. Current law continues to uphold limitations on expressions of
religion in state action. Our legal traditions, as well as reputable science
education standards, support the teaching of evolution in America’s public
schools unencumbered by religious doctrine.

NOTE AND COMMENT
Suesz v. Med-1 Solutions, LLC: Definition of a Judicial District in the Venue
Requirement of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
Daniel Mark .......................................................................................... 83
When a debt collector sues a debtor, the Fair Debt Collection Practices
Act (FDCPA) requires the debt collector to file the suit in the same “judicial
district” in which the debtor resides or where the contract giving rise to the
suit was signed. This applies to state law actions filed in state courts.
Normally this restriction is not an issue because state venue rules generally
require a defendant to be sued in the county in which the defendant lives. And
normally the courts in one county will not be construed as being more than
one judicial district. However, the Seventh Circuit, sitting en banc, held that
the municipal department districts in Cook County, Illinois and the township
small claims courts in Marion County, Indiana constitute separate judicial
districts within their respective counties for the purposes of the FDCPA venue
rule. This venue rule, as interpreted by the Seventh Circuit goes against the
commonly understood meaning of “judicial district” as it has been used by
Congress. Further, this interpretation of the Act functionally operates to
impose federal venue rules on state law actions in state courts—where venue
rules are generally left to state discretion.

Condo-ning Eviction: Questioning the Illinois Approach to Forcible Entry
and Detainer Actions With Regard to Condominium Unit Owners
Jeffrey M. Reed .........................................................................................109
Illinois is currently the only state that allows the forcible eviction of a
condominium unit owner for failing to pay his monthly association dues. In
Spanish Court Two Condominium Association v. Carlson, the Illinois
Supreme Court was asked to determine whether the Illinois Condominium
Property Act and the Forcible Entry and Detainer Act allow a unit owner to
affirmatively defend against a forcible eviction by asserting that the
condominium association was negligent in maintaining the condominium
common areas. In a 4-3 decision, the Illinois Supreme Court held that such
an affirmative defense is not “germane to the distinct purpose of the
proceeding” as is required by the Forcible Entry and Detainer Act.
This Comment explores and questions the legal and policy justifications
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for allowing the forcible eviction of a condominium unit owner but not
providing him with the same affirmative defenses available to others. Within
the context of the Forcible Entry and Detainer Act, the Illinois Condominium
Property Act, and the holding in Spanish Court, this Comment analyzes the
complex nature of the condominium association-unit owner relationship and
the inconsistent application of forcible eviction. The Comment concludes
with suggestions on how forcible eviction in Illinois can be applied with
more consistency and clarity, thus ensuring the rights of Illinois
condominium property owners are not overlooked.
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